Although the objective of secure communication can be achieved by using cryptographic tools, the undeniability that results from cryptographic properties may create a potential threat to the sender of the message. Unfortunately, most existing deniable protocols only provide 1-out-of-2 deniability. When both parties (the sender and the receiver) are allowed to deny generating the message, a dispute might occur between these two parties. The 1-out-of-2 deniable protocol can result in an unfair resolution of the dispute. Therefore, we propose a new model of deniability, called 1-outof-∞ deniability, that can provide full deniability. The 1-out-of-∞ deniability protocol allows the originator of the message to deny that he or she generated the message, since there are an infinite number of possible message generators; at the same time, all transmitted messages can be protected and authenticated between the sender and the intended receiver. Our design can be implemented by using any public-key cryptography technique. We also analyze the correctness of the proposed protocols based on logical rules, and two practical examples are given to illustrate our design.
INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most important services in various network communications. In most secure communications, the following two basic security properties are commonly considered.
Message confidentiality
For the sender, message confidentiality ensures that the messages can be read only by the intended receiver.
Message authentication
For the receiver, message authentication ensures that the message was sent by a specific sender and that the message was not altered en route.
To achieve these two security properties, a mutual authentication protocol must be used, and authenticated session keys should be shared between the communicating parties 2 L. Harn et al. can be verified by any third party. Therefore, the receiver can pass the received message and the corresponding digital signature to any third party or post them on a public directory without the consent of the sender. Since the digital signature provides non-repudiation, the sender cannot deny sending the corresponding message. However, the property of undeniability is not desired in most personal communication applications, e.g. e-mail, instant messaging and electronic voting. Therefore, deniable authentication was proposed to overcome this privacy threat.
There are two types of deniability: plausible deniability and full deniability [10] . For plausible deniability, the message sender only can deny the transmission of a particular message. However, the sender is unable to deny the fact that he/she has communicated with the other participant. On the other hand, full deniability allows the message sender to totally deny that he/she has communicated with the other participant. In this article, we explain how our proposed protocols can achieve full deniability.
In 1998, Dwork et al. [11] first introduced the concept of deniable authentication protocols. Subsequently, many studies have been conducted and published in the literature [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] proposing various approaches for enhancing the security and efficiency of the protocols. On the other hand, designated verifier signatures [17, 18] also can provide deniable authentication services. In 2008, Harn and Ren [19] proposed a new deniable authentication protocol for electronic mail (e-mail) applications based on public-key cryptography. This protocol allows the message sender and message receiver the flexibility of using any public-key algorithms, such as the RSA cryptosystem [20] and the ElGamal cryptosystem [21] . In these solutions, deniability can be achieved because both the sender and the receiver have the ability to generate the transmitted message. Since the receiver knows that he or she did not generate the message, the receiver knows for certain that the sender generated the message. In addition, since any third party cannot know who generated the original message, the sender can deny generating the message. We call this type of deniability as 1-out-of-2 deniability because there is one user who originated the message out of the two users who could have generated the message. All deniable authentication protocols [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] proposed so far belong to this type of deniability.
The deniability is a unique property to protect the privacy of either the sender or the receiver in a secure communication. Most deniable communication protocols are designed to protect the privacy of the sender. If the transmitted messages between the sender and the receiver can be generated by both entities, the sender can deny the generation of the messages when the receiver passes the messages to a third party. In 2010, Yao and Zhao [22] proposed a new type of deniability, called forward deniability, to protect the privacy of the receiver. The forward deniability allows the receiver to deny the recorded messages that do not come from the sender, and the receiver has never talked to the sender, actually does not even know the sender. Yao and Zhao have constructed an Internet key exchange (IKE) protocol with forward and concurrent deniability. However, their deniable protocol belongs to the type of 1-out-of-2 deniability. In this article, the deniability is used to protect sender's privacy. We do not consider the forward deniability.
Unfortunately, the 1-out-of-2 deniable protocol has one potential problem. When both parties are allowed to deny generating the message, a dispute might occur between these two parties. This can be an issue because, when a dispute occurs between two parties, the general public often makes a subjective judgment against the party who has made prior mistakes, such as a criminal record or a bad credit history. Thus, the 1-outof-2 deniable protocol can result in an unfair resolution of the dispute.
One way to improve the fairness of deniability is to increase the number of possible message generators from 2 to n, where n is a large positive integer. As we know, the ring signature [23, 24] can provide anonymity for the message signer. In a ring signature scheme, the message signer selects n ring members, including herself/himself, who could have possibly signed the message. The real signer can generate the ring signature by using her/his private key and the other (n − 1) ring members' public keys without their assistance or even awareness. However, the generated ring signature can convince any verifier that the ring signature indeed was signed by one of the ring members when the real signer's identity is fully anonymous to the verifier. Thus, the ring signature can provide 1-out-of-n deniability. One of the problems of the ring signature is that the computational complexity of generating and verifying a ring signature is proportional to the number of ring members. In addition, we need to point out that there is one major difference between the ring signature and the deniable authentication protocol. In the ring signature, the receiver cannot identify who the real message signer is, but, in the deniable authentication protocol, the receiver can authenticate the sender of the message.
To be truly fair, full deniability should be referred to as 1-out-of-∞ deniability, meaning that there are an infinite number of possible message generators. The computational complexity of a practical, fully deniable protocol should be as simple as a normal message authentication protocol. In this article, we propose two fully deniable communication protocols with message confidentiality and authentication. These proposed protocols are computationally efficient, can provide full deniability for the message originator and ensure the confidentiality and authentication of the message.
The main contributions of this article are summarized as follows:
(i) A new model of deniability, called 1-out-of-∞ deniability, that can provide full deniability is proposed. A fully deniable protocol allows the originator of the message to deny generating the message since the number of potential generators is infinite. In addition, messages can be protected and authenticated between the sender and the intended receiver.
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(ii) Analyses of the deniability of the following security standards are provided: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [25] , Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) [26] , Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol [27] and IKE [28, 29] . (iii) The proposed design can be implemented by using any public-key cryptography. (iv) The proposed design is illustrated by two practical examples. (v) Analyses of the correctness of the proposed protocols are conducted using logical rules.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our analysis of the deniability of some wellknown security standards. In Section 3, we describe our design concept and two design examples that provide confidentiality and authentication. In Section 4, we provide the analysis of the proposed protocols. Our conclusions are presented in Section 5.
ANALYSIS OF SOME WELL-KNOWN SECURITY STANDARDS
First, we define the three types of deniability as follows: 
PGP and S/MIME
In recent years, e-mail has been one of the most important and widely used network applications. It has been used in communications between individuals, business organizations and governmental agencies around the world. E-mail is one of the most popular, non-interactive, communication applications in network environments. PGP and S/MIME are two wellknown and useful secure e-mail solutions. Both solutions use a combination of conventional, symmetric-key (or secretkey) techniques and modern, asymmetric-key (or public-key) techniques to provide message confidentiality and message authentication.
In PGP and S/MIME applications, each user is assumed to have two pairs of public and private keys selected for long-term use. One pair of keys is used for message encryption, and the other pair is used for the digital signature. It is assumed that the public keys of all communication partners already have been stored securely in each user's public-key ring.
Both PGP and S/MIME use a digital envelope to provide message confidentiality. A digital envelope is a technique used by the sender to transmit the message in such a way that only the intended receiver can read the content of the message. First, the sender selects a session key randomly and uses this session key to encrypt the message. Then, the sender uses any public-key encryption algorithm to encrypt this session key by using the receiver's public key. After receiving the encrypted message, the receiver uses her/his private key to decrypt the message and obtain the session key. Then, the receiver uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext. This approach for achieving message confidentiality provides 1-out-of-∞ deniability, since anyone can be the generator of the digital envelope.
Both PGP and S/MIME use a digital signature to provide message authentication. The message sender uses his or her private signing key to generate a digital signature on the message digest. The digital signature is attached along with the message, and both are sent to the receiver. The receiver can use the sender's public key to verify the digital signature. Since the digital signature is an evidence of non-repudiation, this approach for providing message authentication has no deniability at all.
SSL key exchange
SSL is an interactive protocol that provides confidentiality and data integrity for communications over TCP/IP networks. SSL has become a widespread security technology that is used in client-server applications, such as web browsing, Internet commerce and voice-over-IP (VoIP). The SSL protocol supports three kinds of DH-key exchange modes, i.e. two authenticated modes and one unauthenticated mode. DH-key exchange allows the client and the server to establish a common secret key by exchanging public information over an insecure channel. The general goal of the key exchange process in SSL is to establish a pre-master secret known only to the two participants. The pre-master secret will then be used to derive keys for message confidentiality and MAC keys for message authentication. In unauthenticated (anonymous) SSL mode, the pre-master secret is determined by the short-term DH public keys exchanged between the client and the server. Since the short-term DH public keys are unauthenticated, this protocol can provide 1-out-of-∞ deniability. However, anonymous DHkey exchange might suffer from the man-in-the-middle attack. In authenticated mode, the pre-master secret is determined either by fixed DH public keys with digital certificates or by short-term DH public keys signed by signatures (also called ephemeral DH), which are exchanged between the client and the server. In the fixed DH public keys with digital certificates, both participants know the common pre-master secret; so this protocol can provide 1-out-of-2 deniability. The main problem of this protocol is that the pre-master secret is never changed. This feature increases the risk of exposing the pre-master secret. In the short-term DH public keys signed with digital signatures, the pre-master secret is different dynamically. However, since each participant signs the short-term DH public key, this protocol provides no deniability.
In SSL, there is another key exchange based on the RSA scheme. In RSA key exchange, a digital certificate for the server's public key must be made available. The client selects a pre-master secret randomly and then encrypts this pre-master secret with the server's RSA public key to create a digital envelope. Since the digital envelope can only be decrypted by the server's corresponding private key, this method protects the confidentiality of the pre-master secret. However, there is no authentication for the sender of the digital envelope. This key exchange method provides 1-out-of-∞ deniability.
Internet key exchange
IKE is the protocol used to set up a security association in the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [30] protocol suite. IKE uses the DH-key exchange to set up a shared secret, from which cryptographic keys are derived. Public-key techniques are used to mutually authenticate the communicating parties; alternatively, a pre-shared key can be used for this purpose. To allow for a variety of exchange methods, the IKE protocol includes defined modes for the phases. Here, we focus our analysis on key exchanges in the main mode.
In the pre-shared key method, the sender and the receiver have shared a secret key during the initialization. Then, these two parties exchange random nonces. Their common secret is calculated using a keyed-hash function of nonces and the preshared secret. Since the pre-shared secret is known by both entities, this key exchange method can achieve confidentiality and authentication. In addition, this method can provide 1-out-of-2 deniability.
In the revised public-key method, each party generates a onetime DH public key and encrypts this key under a one-time secret key to produce c 1 . The one-time secret key is encrypted using the other party's public key to create a digital envelope as c 2 . The pair (c 1 , c 2 ) is sent to the other party. After receiving (c 1 , c 2 ), the digital envelope c 2 can be opened with the corresponding private key, and, then, the one-time DH public key can be obtained. These two one-time DH public keys are combined to generate the common secret between the two parties. The digital envelope enables the sender and a specified receiver to share a secret. Since the sender can be any user, the digital envelope provides 1-out-of-∞ deniability. By using the digital envelope in both communication directions, the sender and the receiver can share a common secret. Thus, this method can achieve confidentiality and authentication with 1-out-of-∞ deniability.
In the digital signature method, the sender and the receiver must produce public-key certificates to verify the digital signatures. The digital signatures of all messages that are exchanged are used for authentication. Then, these two participants exchange nonces and one-time DH public keys. Finally, the common secret between these two participants can be calculated by a keyed-hash function of nonces and the one-time DH public keys. The use of the digital signature in this method allows confidentiality and authentication, but this method does not provide the property of deniability.
The analytical results of security protocols are summarized in Table 1 .
PROPOSED DESIGN
Design concept
When the source of a message must be assured, the message sender can compute the MAC of the transmitted message Commonly, two methods are used to distribute the common session key SK between the sender and the receiver, i.e. the symmetric-key solution and the asymmetric-key solution. When the symmetric-key solution is used, a secret key sk must be pre-shared between the sender and the receiver. Then, one participant selects the session key SK, encrypts it under the preshared secret key sk and then sends the ciphertext to the other participant. Since both communication parties know the preshared secret key sk, the symmetric-key solution can provide only 1-out-of-2 deniability.
In any public-key cryptosystem, the common session key SK can be constructed by the shared secret between the communicating parties. There are two usual approaches that can be used to share a secret between two parties, i.e. the DH-key exchange method and public-key based encryption. In the DH-key exchange method, the shared secret can be determined by exchanging short-term public keys between two parties. In public-key encryption, a participant is responsible for selecting the secret and then encrypting it under the other participant's long-term public key to create a digital envelope. Note that only the receiver can open the digital envelope with the corresponding private key.
In our design, full deniability is achieved by the fact that the transmitted ciphertext can be generated by any user. However, the security of the one-time key can only be shared between the sender and the receiver. In addition to the two contradictory objectives of deniability and security, we also need to consider the property of authentication.
Message Authentication with full deniability
For message authentication, the receiver of the message wants to make sure that only the specific sender can share the one-time secret key. Using the digital envelope technique, the receiver can select a one-time secret key and then encrypt the key in a digital envelope by using the sender's authenticated, longterm public key. Thus, only the sender can open the digital envelope by using the corresponding long-term private key. This solution can achieve message authentication, and, at the same time, it provides 1-out-of-∞ deniability since any user can generate the digital envelope. Using the DH-key exchange method, the receiver can compute a short-term DH public key and send this one-time public key to the sender. Then, the sender and receiver can share a one-time key based on the receiver's short-term DH key and the sender's long-term DH public key with digital certificate. This solution can achieve message authentication and, at the same time, it provides 1-out-of-∞ deniability since any user can generate the shortterm public key.
Message confidentiality with full deniability
For message confidentiality, the sender of the message wants to make sure that only the intended receiver can share the message. The sender can encrypt the message by using a onetime secret key. Using the digital envelope technique, the sender can encrypt the one-time secret key in a digital envelope by using the receiver's authenticated long-term public key. Thus, the digital envelope can only be opened by the intended receiver by using the corresponding long-term private key. Actually, only the intended receiver can obtain the session key and use this secret key to decrypt the message. This solution can achieve confidentiality, and, at the same time, it provides full deniability since any user can generate the digital envelope. Using the DHkey exchange solution, the sender can compute a short-term DH public key and send this short-term public key to the intended receiver. Then, the sender and the receiver can share a one-time secret key based on the sender's short-term DH public key and the receiver's long-term DH public key with a digital certificate. This solution can also achieve confidentiality, and, at the same time, it provides full deniability since any user can generate the short-term DH public key.
Examples
Fully deniable protocol with authentication
and confidentiality based on DH-key exchange In SSL protocols, there are three algorithms that use the DHkey exchange with confidentiality, i.e. one with full deniability but no authentication, one with 1-out-of-2 deniability and authentication, and one with no deniability and authentication. Here, we propose a protocol with full deniability that also has message authentication and confidentiality.
We assume that Alice and Bob want to communicate with each other. Let the term (x A , y A ) be Alice's pair of long-term private/public keys and the term (x B , y B ) be Bob's pair of the long-term private/public keys, where y A = g x A (modp), y B = g x B (modp) and p is a public prime number. The terms Cert(y A ) and Cert(y B ) are the digital certificates of public keys y A and y B , respectively.
The communication between Alice and Bob, shown in Fig. 1 , includes the following processes: If the earlier-mentioned processes can be executed successfully, both message authentication and confidentiality between Alice and Bob can be ensured.
Fully deniable protocol with confidentiality and authentication based on RSA cryptosystem
In the SSL protocol, there is one algorithm based on RSA digital envelope, but this method does not provide authentication. The digital envelope is one useful method used to provide message confidentiality. Below, we show that digital envelopes can also be used to provide both message confidentiality and authentication with full deniability.
We assume that Alice and Bob want to communicate with each other. Let y A = (e A , n A ) be the long-term RSA public key and d A be Alice's long-term RSA private key, such that
and p A and q A are two large prime numbers selected by Alice.
Cert(y A ) denotes the digital certificate of Alice's long-term public key y A . Similarly, let y B = (e B , n B ) be the long-term RSA public key and d B be Bob's long-term RSA private key, where e B ·d B ≡ 1( mod ϕ(n B )), and Cert(y B ) denotes the digital certificate of Bob's long-term public key y B .
The communication between Alice and Bob, shown in Fig. 2 , includes the following processes: 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In our design examples, both protocols employ the same authenticated encryption scheme to provide message authentication and message confidentiality. In an authenticated encryption scheme, a keyed MAC is used to verify the source of the transmitted message and a symmetric keyed encryption is used to protect the content of the transmitted message. The security analysis of three composition methods of MAC and encryption, namely Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-encrypt and Encryptthen-MAC, has been addressed by Bellare and Namprempre [31] in 2000. The method of Encrypt-then-MAC has been chosen in our design. Based on the results of [31] , Encrypt-then-MAC is secure under the assumption that the given symmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack and the given MAC is unforgeable under chosen-message attack. For more information on the security analysis, interest readers can refer to the literature [30] . In 1990, Burrows et al. [32] proposed useful logical rules to prove the validity of authentication protocols. We use the model (BAN logic) proposed by Burrows et al. to analyze the correctness of our authentication protocols. In the appendix, we show that our protocols can achieve the features of message confidentiality and authentication, as well as provide full deniability for the sender of the message.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we propose a new concept of full deniability, called 1-out-of-∞ deniability. With 1-out-of-∞ deniability, when the sender sends an authenticated and encrypted message to the receiver, the sender can deny transmitting this message since anyone else could have generated the transmitted message.
APPENDIX
A.1. Authentication proof based on BAN logic
According to the analytical procedures of BAN logic, each round of the protocol must be transformed into an idealized form. First, we describe some notations of BAN logic in Table 2 .
A.1.1. Authentication proof for the proposed protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 We use the rules of BAN logic to transform our first protocol, illustrated in Fig. 1 , into the idealized form. The first message M1 1 of the protocol is omitted, since the message just includes a nonce and the certificate of the public key k 1 . This message does not provide any of the logical properties of BAN logic. We describe the other messages in idealized form as follows:
To analyze our first authentication protocol, we made some assumptions without loss of generality, as follows: The assumptions A1 1 and A1 2 are basic assumptions of BAN logic. We analyze the idealized form of the proposed protocol using the earlier-mentioned assumptions and the rules of BAN logic. We show the processes of the proof as follows:
From the above analysis, we prove the mutual authentication of the message between Alice and Bob. Fig. 2 Similarly, we transform our second protocol, illustrated in Fig. 2 , into the idealized form according to the rules of BAN logic. The first message M2 1 and the second message M2 2 of this protocol are omitted, since these two messages do not provide any of the logical properties of BAN logic. We describe the other messages in idealized form as follows:
A.1.2. Authentication proof for the proposed protocol illustrated in
To analyze our second authentication protocol, we make some assumptions without loss of generality as follows: 
A.3. Deniability
Proposition A.9. The proposed protocol as illustrated in Fig. 1 achieves the property of deniability. Proof. We prove that all transcripts transmitted between Alice and Bob could be simulated by anyone else as follows.
Transcript . Actually, the transcripts (r 2 , C 1 , C 2 ) (or (r 1 , C 3 , C 4 ) ) in simulation are indistinguishable from those of Alice (or Bob). Therefore, Bob (or Alice) is not able to prove to a third party that the transcripts were produced by Alice (or Bob).
According to the above simulation, the proposed protocol can achieve full deniability.
Similarly, we can prove that proposed second protocol as illustrated in Fig. 2 also achieve full deniability, since anyone can claim to be the creator of the digital envelope r 1 (or r 2 ) and knows the one-time secret key k 1 (or k 2 ).
Remark. In order to provide 1-out-of-∞ deniability with confidentiality and authentication, the key exchange method of IKE, revised public-key method (Section 2), which employs techniques of both DH-key exchange and digital envelope. But this hybrid technique increases the computational overhead. In our design examples, we showed that using either the DH-key exchange method or the digital envelope can provide 1-outof-∞ deniability with confidentiality and authentication. (See Table 1 .)
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